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MPLOYERS,1 GOVERNMENT PURchasers of health insurance,2
individual consumers, 3 and
lawmakers4,5 are seeking more
information on the quality of health
care. Recently, the President’s Commission on Consumer Protection and
Quality in the Health Care Industry
called for widespread public disclosure
of quality data by all health care provider organizations including health
plans.6 Public disclosure is seen as a
way to enhance informed consumer
decision making, 7 promote quality
improvement,8-10 and increase health
plans’ accountability for health care
delivery.6,11-14
Public disclosure of data on quality
by health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), except those enrolling Medicare patients, is voluntary. In 1998, only
32.5% of all HMOs disclosed their
scores on the National Committee for
Quality Assurance (NCQA) Health Plan
Employer Data and Information Set
(HEDIS) measures,15 the most widely
used set of quality indicators. If health
plans that refuse to disclose quality data
provide inferior care, publicly available data would overstate the average
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Context Public disclosure of quality data on health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
might improve public accountability, inform consumer decision making, and promote
quality improvement. But, because disclosure is voluntary, some HMOs could subvert
these objectives by refusing to release unfavorable data.
Objective To determine the association between HMO quality of care and withdrawal from public disclosure of quality-of-care data the subsequent year.
Design and Setting Retrospective cohort study of administrative and quality-ofcare data on HMOs from the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) annual Quality Compass databases for 1997, 1998, and 1999, including Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) quality scores.
Main Outcome Measure One-year rates of HMO withdrawal from public disclosure of HEDIS scores for plans in the highest and lowest tertiles of HEDIS scores, adjusted for method of data collection and plan model type.
Results Of the 329 HMOs that publicly disclosed HEDIS scores in 1997, 161 plans
(49%) withdrew from public disclosure in 1998. Of the 292 HMOs that disclosed their
scores in 1998 (including 130 newly participating plans), 67 plans (23%) withdrew
from public disclosure in 1999. Plans whose scores ranked in the lowest-quality tertile
were much more likely than plans ranking in the highest-quality tertile to withdraw
from public disclosure in 1998 (odds ratio [OR], 3.6; 95% confidence interval [CI],
2.1-7.0) and 1999 (OR, 5.7; 95% CI, 2.7-17.7).
Conclusion Compared with HMOs receiving higher quality-of-care scores, lowerscoring plans are more likely to stop disclosing their quality data. Voluntary reporting
of quality data by HMOs is ineffective; selective nondisclosure undermines both informed consumer decision making and public accountability.
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quality of HMO care nationally and result in a distorted picture of how a given
plan that discloses quality data compares with that average. Selective nondisclosure could also undermine
public accountability and quality improvement efforts by weakening the impetus to improve quality.
Despite the importance of this issue, no peer-reviewed studies have examined the relationship of HMO quality to willingness to disclose quality
scores. We linked data for multiple
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years from the NCQA’s annual Quality Compass databases to determine if
withdrawal from public disclosure of
HEDIS scores was related to an HMO’s
HEDIS performance 1 year earlier.
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METHODS
Study Sample

The NCQA currently uses HEDIS measures, a standardized set of clinical quality indicators, as the principal clinical
criteria for its HMO accreditation program. Health plans voluntarily submit
these data to the NCQA. The NCQA
lists HEDIS scores of individual HMOs
in its annual Quality Compass database, designed for use by health insurance purchasers and consumers. Until
recently, the NCQA allowed plans to
decline public disclosure of their HEDIS
scores, yet remain fully eligible for
NCQA accreditation. Plans may also
disclose data privately (eg, to large purchasers) but refuse public disclosure.
To determine which HMOs that disclosed HEDIS scores in 1997 (the “1997
cohort,” n=329) or 1998 (the “1998 cohort,” n = 292) withdrew from public
disclosure in the subsequent year, we
linked the 199716 (the first year of use
of HEDIS version 3.0), 1998,17 and
1999 18 Quality Compass databases
(which reflect plan characteristics and
performance in 1996, 1997, and 1998,
respectively). We used a “link-file” database provided by the NCQA to assist
in tracking plans in the Quality Compass databases from year to year, since
name changes were common. In addition to identifying plans that withdrew from public disclosure, we identified plans that merged or closed from
one year to the next. We also identified HMOs that newly began public disclosure in 1998 or 1999. Last, we telephoned each HMO that we identified
as having withdrawn from public disclosure to confirm the plan’s identity
and whether it had changed its name,
merged with another plan, or closed.
For the single plan that had closed, we
obtained the date of closure from its
parent company.
Data Collection

The NCQA requires HMOs to follow a
detailed guide that defines each HEDIS
measure and specifies standards for data
collection. Plans may garner data from
administrative records (administrative method) or supplement the

administrative method with chart reviews (hybrid method).
For each quality indicator, the plan
first draws a sample from the target
population (eg, for mammography,
women aged 52-69 years continuously
enrolled in the HMO for at least 1 year).
The HMO then searches administrative records (eg, payment or radiology
files) to determine if the intervention occurred within a set time frame (eg, 2
years for a mammogram). If no evidence of the intervention is found, the
HMO may choose to search for exclusions (eg, a history of bilateral
mastectomy). For the hybrid method,
when administrative records fail to give
evidence either of the intervention or an
exclusion, the plan reviews sampled patients’ charts for such evidence. The
HEDIS score is calculated as the number of patients who received the intervention divided by the number of eligible patients. The hybrid method, used
by most plans for most measures, usually results in higher quality scores.
The NCQA’s Quality Compass databases contain information on other
health plan characteristics including
ownership status (ie, investor-owned vs
not-for-profit). When data on ownership status was missing, we consulted
InterStudy’s HMO Directory19,20 and/or
telephoned the plan to determine ownership status.
Designation of HMO Quality

We assessed HMO quality using all
HEDIS measures listed under the
NCQA’s rubric, “effectiveness of care.”
This rubric encompasses 13 distinct measures for the 1997 cohort, 4 of which are
rates for individual childhood immunizations (measles-mumps-rubella, hepatitis B, diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus, and
oral polio virus), and one of which is a
rate for completion of all of these 4 childhood immunizations. For the 1998 cohort, vaccination for varicella and Haemophilus influenzae type B were added as
measures and are included in the rate for
completion of all recommended childhood immunizations that year. To avoid
giving undue weight to childhood immunizations, we analyzed only the com-
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bined immunization rate, yielding 9
HEDIS scores for each plan. We ranked
HMOs by quality in 2 ways. First, we
ranked HMOs according to their score
on each of the 9 HEDIS measures separately. Second, we ranked HMOs based
on the average of ranks for all individual HEDIS measures for which the
plan submitted data. For this latter analysis, we included only plans reporting
scores on at least 5 of the 9 HEDIS measures. When more than 1 plan reported
the same score, we assigned these plans
the same rank. We then divided the plans
into tertiles on the basis of their quality
ranks. All analyses were performed using SAS.21
Outcomes

Our primary outcome was withdrawal
from public disclosure of HEDIS scores
1 year after a previous public disclosure. We defined withdrawal as either
(1) a failure to submit any HEDIS scores
to NCQA or (2) submission of HEDIS
scores but refusal to allow public disclosure. Plans that disclosed even a
single HEDIS score or that merged and
disclosed pooled HEDIS scores were not
considered to have withdrawn. We excluded from our analysis the single plan
that closed.
Statistical Analysis

For each of the 9 separate HEDIS measures we classified plans by whether
their scores fell in the highest, middle,
or lowest tertile of the 329 plans publicly disclosing data in 1997. We then
calculated for each quality tertile the
proportion of plans that withdrew from
disclosure 1 year later and used the 2
test to compare the proportions withdrawing in the highest and lowest tertiles. We report 2-tailed P values for all
tests.
We repeated this analysis using the
1998 cohort (the 292 plans disclosing
data in 1998), classifying plans according to their quality ranks in 1998 and
comparing withdrawal rates 1 year later
among plans in the highest- and lowestquality tertiles.
Thus, each analysis examined whether
the quality rank in a given year pre-
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dicted the likelihood of publicly disclosing quality scores in the subsequent year.
We also used multiple logistic regression to estimate the adjusted odds ratio
(OR) for withdrawal from public disclosure for HMOs in the lowest vs highest tertile of average plan rank for all

9 measures combined. We considered
plan characteristics (model type, geographic location, and method of data collection) as potential covariates. The final multivariate models included only
those variables that showed a significant univariate association (P⬍.05) with
the outcome in both cohort years. In ad-

Table 1. Characteristics of HMOs Allowing Public Disclosure of HEDIS Scores in 1997
and 1998*

Ownership
Investor-owned
Not-for-profit
Model type
Independent practice association
Network
Group
Staff
Mixed
Other
Location
New England
Mid Atlantic
South Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Not listed

1997, No. (%)
(n = 329)

1998, No. (%)
(n = 292)

248 (75.4)
81 (24.6)

188 (64.4)
104 (35.6)

121 (36.8)
22 (6.7)
24 (7.3)
6 (1.8)
151 (45.9)
5 (1.5)

148 (50.7)
25 (8.6)
22 (7.5)
4 (1.4)
88 (30.1)
5 (1.7)

22 (6.7)
58 (17.6)
72 (21.9)
50 (15.2)
26 (7.9)
46 (14.0)
25 (7.6)
30 (9.1)
...

25 (8.6)
53 (18.2)
46 (15.8)
62 (21.2)
27 (9.2)
25 (8.6)
26 (8.9)
27 (9.2)
1 (0.003)

*HMO indicates health maintenance organization; HEDIS, Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set.

dition, because collecting data by the hybrid method produces higher HEDIS
scores than the administrative method,22
we controlled for the method of data collection in all multivariate models.
Because our previous research had
shown that investor-owned plans
achieve lower HEDIS scores than notfor-profit plans, we also explored the
interrelationships among ownership
status, tertile of average rank on HEDIS
scores, and the likelihood of withdrawal from public disclosure with
2⫻2 contingency tables and 2 tests of
significance for both the 1997 and 1998
cohorts. Specifically, we compared investor-owned and not-for-profit plans
with regard to the percentage of plans
in the lowest tertile of average HEDIS
rank and the percentage of plans that
withdrew from public disclosure. Last,
we compared plans in the upper and
lower tertiles of average HEDIS rank
with regard to the percentage of plans
that withdrew from public disclosure
among investor-owned and not-forprofit plans separately.
Finally, to quantify the clinical significance of differences in quality between the highest- and lowest-quality
plans, we calculated the mean (SD) rates
for each indicator for the highest- and
lowest-quality tertile.

Figure. Withdrawal From Public Disclosure of HEDIS Scores by HMOs From 1997 to 1999

130 HMO Plans Newly
Began Public Disclosure

1997 Cohort
329 HMO Plans Publicly
Disclosed HEDIS
Scores in 1997

Mergers
168 Plans
162 Plans

96 HMO Plans Newly
Began Public Disclosure

1998 Cohort
292 HMO Plans Publicly
Disclosed HEDIS
Scores in 1998

Mergers
224 Plans
181 Plans

277 HMO Plans Publicly
Disclosed HEDIS
Scores in 1999

1 Plan Closed

161 HMO Plans Withdrew From Public Disclosure
88 Submitted Data But Refused Public Disclosure
73 Did Not Submit Data

67 HMO Plans Withdrew From Public Disclosure
34 Submitted Data But Refused Public Disclosure
33 Did Not Submit Data

The number of health maintenance organization (HMO) plans submitting Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) data to the National Committee for
Quality Assurance and allowing public disclosure for 1997, 1998, and 1999 are shown in boxes. Arrows depict changes in disclosure status of plans from 1997-1998
and from 1998-1999. Numbers indicate HMOs that withdrew from public disclosure of HEDIS scores either through submitting data to the National Committee for
Quality Assurance, but declining public disclosure, or through a failure to submit data. Also depicted are changes in the number of plans publicly reporting data due to
mergers of existing plans or the addition of newly participating plans.
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RESULTS

that withdrew from public disclosure
continued to submit HEDIS scores to
NCQA (Figure).

Characteristics of the Health Plans

The majority of HMOs in both the 1997
and 1998 cohorts were investorowned and were independent practice
associations or mixed model type plans
(TABLE 1). Plans in both cohorts were
most commonly located in the South
Atlantic, Mid Atlantic, and East North
Central regions.

HMO Quality Rank and Withdrawal
From Public Disclosure
of HEDIS Scores

HEDIS scores among HMOs that allowed public release of their quality data
varied widely in both 1997 and 1998
(TABLE 2). Absolute differences in mean
HEDIS scores of plans in the lowest and
highest tertiles ranged from 15.6 to 42.3
percentage points in the 1997 cohort
and from 14.6 to 37.5 percentage points
in the 1998 cohort. For example, the
mean immunization completion rate for
13-year-olds in the 1997 cohort was
74.7% for plans in the highest-quality
tertile, but only 32.4% for plans in the
lowest-quality tertile.
Health maintenance organizations in
the lowest tertile were significantly
more likely to withdraw from public
disclosure than plans in the highest tertile for 7 of the 9 measures in the 1997

HMO Withdrawal From
Public Disclosure of HEDIS Scores

A total of 329 HMOs allowed public disclosure of their HEDIS scores in 1997
(FIGURE). Of these plans, 161 (49%)
withdrew from public disclosure the following year. In 1998, 292 plans allowed public disclosure of their HEDIS
scores. This cohort consisted of 162
plans (after mergers) that allowed public disclosure in 1997, plus 130 newly
participating plans. Of these 292 plans,
67 (23%) withdrew from public disclosure in 1999. For both the 1997 and
1998 cohorts, just over half of all plans

cohort and for 6 of 9 measures in the
1998 cohort (TABLE 3). Plans in the
lowest tertile were 1.6 to 2.7 times more
likely to withdraw from public disclosure than plans in the highest tertile in
the 1997 cohort and 2.2 to 7.0 times
more likely to withdraw in the 1998 cohort. For 7 of the 9 indicators in the
1997 cohort, more than half of plans
in the lowest-quality tertile withdrew
from public disclosure of HEDIS scores
the subsequent year. Withdrawal rates
for the 1998 cohort were somewhat
lower; nonetheless, for 8 of 9 indicators, at least 25% of plans in the lowestquality tertile withdrew the subsequent year.
Health maintenance organizations in
the lowest tertile of overall quality (average rank for all 9 HEDIS measures)
were more likely to withdraw from public disclosure than plans in the highest tertile in both the 1997 (OR, 3.6;
95% confidence interval [CI], 2.17.0) and 1998 (OR, 5.7; 95% CI, 2.717.7) cohorts after adjustment for the

Table 2. Mean HEDIS Scores Among Lowest- and Highest-Ranked HMOs Publicly Disclosing Scores in 1997 and 1998*
Mean (SD) HEDIS Scores
1997 Scores

1998 Scores
Difference
Between Means
(95% CI)

18.1 (5.0)

HMOs in
Highest Tertile
of Quality
43.2 (7.1)

42.3 (38.1-46.3)

0.6 (0.8)

17.8 (9.7)

17.2 (14.7-19.7)

78.7 (3.5)

15.6 (13.9-17.4)

65.9 (4.2)

80.5 (3.7)

14.6 (13.0-16.2)

60.5 (7.3)

81.3 (4.1)

20.8 (18.5-23.0)

64.2 (5.5)

82.0 (3.7)

17.8 (16.0-19.8)

73.1 (12.9)
40.4 (10.2)

93.1 (2.7)
75.2 (10.2)

20.0 (16.8-23.2)
34.8 (30.5-39.1)

73.4 (11.9)
49.1 (13.2)

94.3 (2.1)
84.2 (4.2)

20.9 (17.9-23.9)
35.1 (31.4-38.9)

42.0 (7.6)

83.0 (6.7)

41.0 (37.0-45.0)

58.0 (12.5)

91.6 (4.3)

33.6 (28.9-38.3)

Patients with diabetes who had an
eye examination in the past year

23.5 (6.0)

54.0 (8.2)

30.5 (27.7-33.3)

25.9 (6.0)

57.0 (8.7)

31.1 (28.0-34.2)

Outpatient follow-up within 30 days
after hospitalization for a mental
disorder

57.9 (12.3)

85.0 (5.1)

27.1 (23.0-31.3)

47.8 (14.6)

85.3 (5.4)

37.5 (32.8-42.3)

HEDIS Measure
Childhood immunization completion
for 2-year-olds†
Immunization completion for
13-year-olds‡
Mammography within 2 years for
women aged 52-69 y
Papanicolaou test within 3 years for
women aged 21-64 y
First trimester prenatal care
Women receiving postpartum
checkup§
␤-Blocker prescription filled for
patients discharged after a
myocardial infarction㛳

HMOs in
Lowest Tertile
of Quality

HMOs in
Highest Tertile
of Quality

Difference
Between Means
(95% CI)

HMOs in
Lowest Tertile
of Quality

51.3 (9.5)

80.3 (6.7)

29.0 (25.6-32.4)

32.4 (9.3)

74.7 (8.8)

63.1 (5.7)

25.1 (22.4-27.9)

*HEDIS indicates Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set; HMO, health maintenance organization; and CI, confidence interval.
†Includes measles-mumps-rubella (MMR), hepatitis B, diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus, and oral polio virus for both 1997 and 1998. For 1998, also includes Haemophilus influenzae
type B and varicella vaccine if not immune.
‡Includes all childhood immunizations plus a second dose of MMR for both 1997 and 1998. For 1998, also includes third hepatitis B vaccine.
§Defined as within 42 days of delivery in 1997, and between 21 and 56 days after delivery in 1998.
㛳Contraindications defined as International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision diagnosis of insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, asthma, heart block greater than first degree,
sinus bradycardia, congestive heart failure, left ventricular dysfunction, or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
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method of data collection and plan
model type (the only plan characteristic consistently correlated with plan
withdrawal in univariate analyses).
In our analyses according to plan ownership status, investor-owned plans were
more likely than not-for-profit plans to
be in the lowest-quality tertile in both
the 1997 (RR=3.4; 95% CI, 1.9-5.8) and
1998 (RR = 1.9; 95% CI, 1.3-2.7) cohorts and to withdraw from public disclosure in both the 1997 (RR=5.7; 95%
CI, 2.6-12.2) and 1998 (RR=1.3; 95%
CI, 0.7-2.5) cohorts, although this difference was not statistically significant
for the latter cohort. It appears, however, that poor quality rather than profit
status per se was the primary determinant of withdrawal from public disclosure. The poorest-quality plans were
more likely to withdraw from disclosure than the best-quality plans among
both investor-owned plans (RR = 1.5;
95% CI, 1.1-2.1), and not-for-profit
plans (RR=2.2; 95% CI, 0.5-10.4) in the
1997 cohort. Similar results were ob-

tained in the 1998 cohort for both investor-owned (RR = 2.7; 95% CI, 1.16.6) and not-for-profit plans (RR=20.0;
95% CI, 2.8-149.8).
COMMENT
While the total number of HMOs that
publicly disclosed HEDIS quality scores
changed little each year from 1997 to
1999, the composition of this group
changed substantially. Forty-eight percent of plans in the 1997 cohort and
23% of plans in the 1998 cohort withdrew from public disclosure 1 year later.
Quality scores varied substantially
among HMOs, and lower-scoring plans
were much more likely to withdraw.
No previous peer-reviewed studies
have examined the relationship between HMO quality scores and withdrawal from participation in public disclosure of scores in the HEDIS program.
Previous yearly NCQA reports have
documented that nondisclosing plans
score poorly. However, our longitudinal analyses provide a quite different

view than these reports based on crosssectional data. Our approach encompasses plans that drop out of the HEDIS
program entirely, in addition to those
that refuse disclosure. For example, a
1998 NCQA report that provided data
on nondisclosing plans included only 88
of the 161 (nondisclosing and dropout) plans we analyzed.
We also delineate, for the first time,
the shifting cohort of HEDIS participants and disclosers. Many plans are
disclosers one year and nondisclosers
the next (or vice versa). Hence the manipulation of the HEDIS monitoring
system is more pervasive than is
apparent from the NCQA’s crosssectional comparisons. The differences in analytic approaches also give
rise to quite different interpretations.
The NCQA suggests that the better
cross-sectional performance of disclosing plans is evidence that their quality
monitoring system is working. In contrast, our longitudinal data imply that
gaming of the system is so extensive as

Table 3. Withdrawal From Public Disclosure of HEDIS Scores According to HMO Quality Rank Tertile 1 Year Earlier*
Percentage of HMOs Withdrawing From Public Reporting of HEDIS Scores
1998
Lowest Tertile Highest Tertile
of Quality
of Quality
in 1997
in 1997

1999
Relative
Risk
(95% CI)

P
Value

Lowest Tertile Highest Tertile
of Quality
of Quality
in 1998
in 1998

66

31

2.1 (1.5-3.0)

⬍.001

32

10

Relative
Risk
(95% CI)
3.2 (1.6-6.8)

54

27

2.0 (1.3-3.1)

⬍.001

39

6

7.0 (2.6-18.8)

66

25

2.7 (1.9-3.9)

⬍.001

31

12

2.7 (1.4-5.1)

.001

Papanicolaou test within 3 years
for women aged 21-64 y

63

29

2.2 (1.5-3.1)

⬍.001

29

13

2.2 (1.2-3.9)

.008

First trimester prenatal care
Women receiving postpartum
checkup§

63
40

30
51

2.1 (1.5-2.9)
0.8 (0.6-1.1)

⬍.001
.14

25
26

18
9

1.4 (0.8-2.5)
2.8 (1.3-6.0)

.24
.003

␤-Blocker prescription filled for
patients discharged after a
myocardial infarction㛳
Patients with diabetes who had
an eye examination in the
past year
Outpatient follow-up within 30
days after hospitalization
with a mental disorder

56

36

1.6 (1.0-2.4)

.04

22

9

2.3 (0.9-6.1)

.09

64

37

1.8 (1.3-2.4)

⬍.001

35

13

2.7 (1.5-5.0)

⬍.001

40

32

1.2 (0.8-1.9)

.34

26

14

1.9 (0.9-3.7)

.08

HEDIS Measure
Childhood immunization
completion for 2-year-olds†
Immunization completion for
13-year-olds‡
Mammography within 2 years
for women aged 52-69 y

P
Value
⬍.001
⬍.001

*HEDIS indicates Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set; HMO, health maintenance organization; and CI, confidence interval.
†Includes measles-mumps-rubella (MMR), hepatitis B, diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus, and oral polio virus for both 1997 and 1998. For 1998, also includes Haemophilus influenzae
type B and varicella vaccine if not immune.
‡Includes all childhood immunizations plus a second dose of MMR for both 1997 and 1998. For 1998, also includes third hepatitis B vaccine.
§Defined as within 42 days of delivery in 1997, and between 21 and 56 days after delivery in 1998.
㛳Contraindications defined as International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision diagnosis of insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, asthma, heart block greater than first degree,
sinus bradycardia, congestive heart failure, left ventricular dysfunction, or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
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to potentially undermine the quality
monitoring process.
Why do HMO executives at lowerscoring plans choose to withdraw from
reporting of HEDIS scores? They might
believe that their plan’s low HEDIS
scores result from inadequate data collection methods that could understate
true quality. Perhaps some suspect that
their plan will suffer from biased comparisons since not all plans’ data were
audited, especially in the earlier years of
the HEDIS program. They may become aware of such issues only after disclosing HEDIS scores at least once. Some
executives may regard the costs of data
collection as too high,23-25 which could
explain why some higher-scoring plans
withdrew from HEDIS participation. But
costs cannot explain most withdrawals; about half of the plans withdrawing from public disclosure still collected and submitted HEDIS scores
(Figure).
The most likely explanation for our
findings is that many plans withdraw
because they fear (or know) that they
will score low again. Low scores might
place such plans at a marketing disadvantage, especially if nondisclosure carries little stigma. Regardless of the explanation, however, our results imply
that voluntary disclosure of quality data,
the primary national mechanism for
HMO quality oversight, is failing to
meet its stated goals of informing consumer decision making, providing incentives to improve quality and increasing public accountability.
The NCQA’s HEDIS program represents the most comprehensive and influential quality assessment tool26 for
HMOs (and any health care sector).
HEDIS measures are standardized and
subject to external audit to verify the data
collection and calculation process.22 Yet,
the selective withdrawal by lowerscoring plans means that enrollees, purchasers, and the public often cannot
monitor a plan’s quality over time. Furthermore, it implies that the average
quality of HMO care in the United States
is unknowable. Average published
HEDIS scores could improve even if the
actual average quality were stable or even

deteriorating. Hence, HEDIS scores cannot be used as an accurate barometer of
HMOs’ attainment of specific health
goals for the nation.11,27,28
The variation in HEDIS scores that
we observed between the highest- and
lowest-scoring plans has substantial
clinical relevance. For example, receiving a ␤-blocker after a myocardial infarction reduces the risk of cardiovascular death and nonfatal reinfarction by
22% and 27%, respectively.29,30 Yet in
1998, a patient surviving a myocardial
infarction was only half as likely to receive this medication if enrolled in a
health plan in the lowest compared with
the highest tertile of quality.
Voluntary disclosure allows HMOs
to use the HEDIS program as a marketing tool, sacrificing its value as a
quality assessment and improvement
tool. When scores are high, plans can
disclose them and take advantage of
consequent marketing benefits. When
scores are low, plans can withdraw from
public disclosure. Indeed, until recently, HMOs that refuse to publicly
disclose their quality scores were fully
eligible for NCQA accreditation; only
4% of HMO applications for accreditation were rejected in 1998.31
Investor-owned plans were somewhat more likely to withdraw from public reporting. However, poor quality was
associated with withdrawal from public disclosure among both investorowned and not-for-profit plans. Apparently, the increasingly competitive
health care marketplace drives health
plans (irrespective of ownership status) to control data release to maximize competitive advantage.
Lack of disclosure is not the only challenge to the HMO quality oversight process. Patients appear to have difficulty
understanding quality data32,33 and use
it infrequently when selecting a health
plan.34,35 Many employers offer only 1
health insurance option,36 foreclosing
patient choice. Even large employers
make only limited use of quality data,1,8
instead, selecting health plans primarily on the basis of cost.1,37 Indeed, in the
current health care market, evidence that
public disclosure of quality data im-
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proves quality is equivocal.9,10,38,39 Therefore, improving accountability and encouraging quality improvement would
require, at the very least, that quality data
be presented in a patient-friendly format, that patients be offered a choice of
health plans, and that both patients and
large purchasers make purchasing decisions based on quality rather than
price. Without publicly available data on
quality, however, achieving these goals
would accomplish little.
Our findings should also be viewed
in the context of the broader debate on
public disclosure of quality data by all
types of health care provider organizations. Like HMOs, physicians and hospitals have opposed mandatory disclosure of performance data. Improvement
of quality and accountability may ultimately depend on forthright disclosure of quality data at all levels of the
health care system.
Our study has several limitations.
First, since data on nondisclosing plans
were, by definition, unavailable to us,
we used a plan’s performance 1 year
earlier as a proxy for current performance. Plans know their current HEDIS
scores before having to decide whether
or not to disclose them. Thus, it seems
likely that low-scoring plans that improved would choose to continue disclosing, while those that did not would
be more likely to withdraw from disclosure. Hence, our study may underestimate the relationship between low scores
and withdrawal from disclosure. Second, we cannot exclude the possibility
that unmeasured plan characteristics
such as geographic dispersal of medical provider sites or differences in data
systems could systematically influence
our results. Third, although our data
show that lower-scoring plans are more
likely to withdraw from disclosure, we
have no direct data on HMO executives’ reasoning regarding this decision. Last, only HMOs are currently eligible to submit HEDIS scores and receive
NCQA accreditation. Whether the selective reporting of quality data we observed would apply to fee-for-service insurance or other facets of the health care
system is unknown.

(Reprinted) JAMA, September 25, 2002—Vol 288, No. 12 1489
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Few industries whose impact on
health rivals HMOs’ are as free of public oversight. Airlines and car manufacturers are required to disclose standardized data on the safety of their
products. Our findings suggest that voluntary quality reporting by HMOs will
not create the preconditions for effective quality oversight. Reporting and
public disclosure of HEDIS and other
meaningful quality data by HMOs
should be mandatory.
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